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Joint enterprise is a doctrine of criminal law which permits two or more defendants to be 
convicted of the same criminal offence in relation to the same incident, even where they had 
differing types or levels of involvement in the incident. For centuries, it has been an 
established and relatively uncontentious aspect of the criminal law of England and Wales 
that an individual who has intentionally assisted or encouraged another to commit an offence 
can be held liable for that offence as a secondary party or accessory; and that both 
individuals can be convicted even if it is not known which of them committed the essential 
act and which was the accessory. 
 
However, the doctrine of joint enterprise has been subject to widespread and vehement 
criticisms in recent years. The criticisms have focused on what is said to be the potential for 
individuals to be convicted and sentenced for the most serious offences – including murder – 
on the basis of highly peripheral involvement in the criminal acts. Until very recently, a 
particular concern has been that form of joint enterprise commonly referred to as ‘parasitic 
accessorial liability’. This form of accessorial or secondary liability had developed through 
case law over the course of the past three decades,1 and related to the situation in which 
two or more individuals together carried out one offence, in the course of which one of them 
committed a second offence which the other(s) had foreseen he might commit. Thus at the 
heart of parasitic accessorial liability was the principle that defendants’ liability could rest on 
their foresight of a possible collateral offence committed by their co-defendant.  
 
In October 2015, a joint session of the UK Supreme Court and Privy Council heard two 
appeals against joint enterprise convictions for murder: R v Jogee and Ruddock v The 
Queen (Jamaica).2 Both appeals were allowed, in a decision that effectively abolished 
parasitic accessorial liability.3  In the judgment handed down on 18 February 2016, it was 
stated that the common law on joint enterprise had previously taken a ‘wrong turn’: the 
courts should not have treated defendants’ foresight of an offence as equivalent to intent to 
assist that offence, and this had had the effect of over-extending the scope of secondary 
liability. The judgment was also critical of the way in which ‘generalised and questionable 
policy arguments’ had contributed to the development of the law.  
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Following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Jogee, defendants can be convicted as 
accessories to an offence only if they acted to assist or encourage the commission of the 
crime with the intent to do so; foresight of the offence is no longer as a matter of law 
sufficient, but is merely evidence from which intent can be inferred. The Supreme Court 
ruling does not have any implications for cases in which two or more defendants are 
prosecuted as joint principals: that is, where they are all held directly responsible for the 
commission of the offence. It also remains the case that a defendant can be found guilty on 
the basis of being either a principal or an accessory, where it is not possible to prove 
exactly what role in the offence the defendant played. 
 
Prior to Jogee, the concept of parasitic accessorial liability had permitted defendants to be 
convicted of an offence in relation to which they had no direct intent and no direct intent to 
assist or encourage, and in the commission of which they had no direct involvement. This 
was especially troubling in cases of murder, where a higher threshold of culpability had to be 
satisfied for the principal defendant to be found guilty (he must have killed with intent to kill 
or cause serious injury) than for the accessory to be found guilty (he could have simply 
foreseen that the principal defendant might kill with intent to kill or cause serious injury). The 
abolition of parasitic accessorial liability by the Supreme Court is an important and overdue 
correction to the doctrine of joint enterprise. 
 
However, it is clear that many challenges remain in relation to the prosecution of joint 
enterprise cases, and the full implications of the Jogee ruling for determining the basis of 
conviction are yet to be seen. While a defendant can now only be convicted as an accessory 
if he has intended to assist or encourage the offence, identifying what amounts to intent to 
assist or encourage can be a difficult task. For example, the Supreme Court made it clear 
that the while foresight should no longer be regarded, in and of itself, ‘as an inevitable 
yardstick of common purpose’, it nevertheless remains legitimate ‘to treat [foresight] as 
evidence of intent’ (para 87; emphasis added). An accessory’s knowledge of the essential 
matters or background facts relating to the principal’s criminal act may therefore be central to 
consideration of the accessory’s intent: for example, ‘Knowledge or ignorance that weapons 
generally, or a particular weapon, is carried by D1 will be evidence going to what the 
intention of D2 was, and may be irresistible evidence one way or the other, but it is evidence 
and no more’ (para 98).4 Noting that it is ‘doubtful’ that the Jogee ruling ‘has conclusively 
resolved the problems that bedevilled this area of the law’, Ormerod and Laird have 
examined the complexities of the relationship between ‘intention’ and ‘foresight’..5  
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After Jogee, there also remain some significant questions about the sentencing of offenders 
in joint enterprise cases. The numbers of such cases may decline to some extent as a result 
of the abolition of parasitic accessorial liability, but there is no doubt that the courts will 
continue to sentence large numbers of cases in which multiple offenders have been 
convicted of the same offence – whether as joint principals or on the basis that one or more 
had acted (intentionally) to assist or encourage the other(s). It is an uncontentious point that 
those convicted offenders whose liability is simply and unequivocally accessorial are likely to 
be less culpable than those convicted as principals; but how can any such lesser culpability 
be assessed, and to what extent should it be reflected in sentencing?  
 
The mandatory life sentence in joint enterprise murder cases 
 
The sentencing of offenders convicted of murder on a joint enterprise basis has long been a 
particular concern among critics of joint enterprise, who observe that the mandatory life 
sentence for murder means that the judge has limited scope to reflect in the sentence the 
lesser culpability of an accessory. Nevertheless, while judges are required to pass a life 
sentence on any accessory in a murder case, they have discretion over the minimum term 
they impose, since the statutory ‘starting points’ for the tariff, as set out in Schedule 21 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, can be adjusted upwards or downwards in light of aggravating 
and mitigating factors. Accordingly, the resultant minimum term can be ‘of any length’, 
regardless of the starting point (Schedule 21, paragraph 9).  
 
The question that therefore arises is whether a given offender’s lesser role in a murder, 
relative to that of any co-perpetrators, can or should be treated as mitigation which would 
reduce the minimum term. Offender role in relation to others is not included among the (non-
exhaustive) aggravating and mitigating factors cited in Schedule 21 as relevant to the 
minimum term. The general principle of accessorial liability, in the way in which it is 
formalised in statute, would appear to preclude the treatment of a lesser role as significant 
mitigation: paragraph 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 states that anyone who 
‘shall aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any indictable offence … shall be 
liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender’ (emphasis added). That the 
courts are expected to apply the ‘draconian’ Schedule 21 rules for minimum terms to 
individuals convicted of murder as secondary parties, as they do to principals, has been 
noted by Buxton6 with reference not just to the Accessories and Abettors Act but also to the 
case of Sanchez.7 This case saw the Court of Appeal substitute a short tariff imposed by the 
trial judge on an accessory to murder with a considerably longer term.  
 
In the absence of detailed data on sentences passed in joint enterprise murder cases, it is 
not known whether judges do in practice tend to impose broadly similar minimum terms on 
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 principal and secondary parties. And while such an approach would be lawful, whether it is 
fair is another and pressing question that demands consideration. These issues also raises 
broader questions concerning the sentencing of murder: most fundamentally, whether the 
mandatory life sentence for murder should be reviewed, as has been urged by the Law 
Commission among many others.8 The case for such a review is strengthened by the finding 
of public attitude research that public support for the sentence is by no means as high as 
politicians tend to assume.9 Whether or not the mandatory life sentence is retained, there is 
also a strong case for the introduction of a sentencing guideline for murder which – as, for 
example, has been argued by Fitz-Gibbon – could take a more comprehensive approach to 
aggravation and mitigation than the ‘formulaic’ Schedule 21 allows.10 
  
Sentencing in joint enterprise cases not involving murder 
 
In the sentencing of joint enterprise cases involving offences other than murder, judges 
potentially have more leeway to reflect in sentencing each individual’s specific role in the 
offence, since there is no mandatory life sentence. However, as in murder cases with 
respect to the determination of the minimum term, in non-murder cases the question arises 
of whether and to what extent an individual’s accessory role should serve as mitigation, 
especially in view of the statutory obligation on sentencers to treat an accessory ‘as a 
principal offender’.  
 
Sentencing Council guidelines are not consistent in how they address the sentencing of co-
perpetrators. The Overarching Principles guideline on offence seriousness, issued by the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council in 2004,11 describes group offending (specifically, ‘Offenders 
operating in groups or gangs’) as, in itself, an aggravating factor. However, a greater or 
lesser role within a group is not cited as a source of aggravation or mitigation. Ashworth has 
noted that the justification for treating group offending as aggravation ‘probably lies in the 
greater harm which it is believed to involve’ – for example, in terms of fear caused to victims 
– although the guideline lists it among ‘factors  indicating higher culpability’ rather than as a 
factor associated with more serious harm.12 
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 The offence-specific guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council present a variety of 
approaches to assessing culpability of offenders who acted in conjunction with others. This 
is evident, for example, in the Robbery guideline.13 With respect to robberies that can be 
categorised as ‘professionally planned commercial’ or ‘dwelling’, the offender’s role within a 
group is cited as relevant to the determination (in Step One of decision-making) of overall 
culpability and thereby of offence category and sentence starting point and range. 
Specifically, a ‘leading role where offending is part of a group activity’ indicates higher 
culpability; a ‘significant role’ medium culpability; and the offender having ‘performed a 
limited function under direction’ or having been ‘involved through coercion, intimidation or 
exploitation’ indicate lesser culpability. On the other hand, with respect to ‘street and less 
sophisticated commercial robbery’, only the last-named of these group-related factors 
(involvement ‘through coercion, intimidation or exploitation’) is listed as relevant to offence 
category. Here, the offender’s ‘leading role’ in a group is an aggravating factor to be 
considered as part of the (Step Two) decision on what specific sentence should be passed 
within the stipulated category.  
 
The Burglary guideline, like Robbery, covers three types of offence: aggravated, domestic 
and non-domestic burglary.14 For all three, an offender’s membership ‘of a group or gang’ is 
a factor indicating higher culpability for the (Step One) purpose of determining offence 
category; but role within the group is not cited as relevant to category – with the exception 
that being ‘exploited by others’ is said to indicate lower culpability. Among the mitigating 
factors listed with respect to the (Step Two) consideration of specific sentence, is 
‘subordinate role in a group or gang’. The Assault guideline, meanwhile, cites ‘leading role in 
group or gang’ and ‘subordinate role’ as factors indicating higher and lower culpability, 
respectively, for the purpose of determining offence category in the sentencing of all six 
offences covered by the guideline. And for most offences dealt with by the Sexual Offences 
guideline,15 ‘offender acts together with others to commit the offence’ is deemed relevant to 
overall culpability and thereby offence category, but offender role relative to co-perpetrators 
is not included as a factor to be considered at either Step One or Two of the decision-making 
process. 
 
Towards more consistent and principled sentencing in joint enterprise cases? 
 
At a time when the law governing the prosecution of secondary parties has come under 
close scrutiny and undergone significant change, it is important to examine the principle and 
practice of sentencing in joint enterprise cases. Some of the particular concerns about 
sentencing of accessories in murder cases, which have a bearing on wider questions about 
the sentencing of murder, have been briefly rehearsed above. The preceding discussion has 
also demonstrated the notable lack of consistency in the existing Sentencing Council 
guidance on the sentencing of offenders who acted in groups. There would be much merit to 
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 the development by the Sentencing Council of a set of a single, clear set of principles to 
guide sentencers in dealing with accessorial liability and group offending more generally. 
Such principles could, for example:   
 
- Clarify the scope within existing legislation (Accessories and Abettors Act 1861) and 
case law for reflecting accessorial liability in sentencing. 
- Clarify the extent of mitigation which – with a view to achieving proportionality and 
fairness – can potentially be attached to accessorial liability, with respect to both 
setting the minimum term in life sentences for murder and determining sentence type 
and length in other cases; 
- Identify whether accessorial liability should be (in the terminology of the current 
Sentencing Council offence-specific guidelines) a ‘Step One’ consideration with 
regard to offence category or a ‘Step Two’ consideration with regard to the specific 
sentence within the category; 
- Define the components of accessorial liability as they pertain to sentencing, and as 
they relate to other potentially mitigating ways of playing a lesser role in group 
offending, such as involvement through intimidation or coercion by others; 
- Determine the relationship or intersection between aggravation reflecting the 
essential fact of group offending and mitigation reflecting an accessorial (or other 
lesser) role in the group. 
 
A related and important consideration, which could also be addressed through the 
development of principles for sentencing group offences, is the difficulty faced by the 
sentencer if the respective parts played by the different offenders remain undefined at the 
point of conviction. As noted above, a failure to disentangle defendants’ roles as principals or 
accessories does not necessarily impede the prosecution case. Research by the author and 
colleagues, involving a review of CPS files and court transcripts from multi-defendant 
prosecutions for murder, section 18 assault and robbery, has pointed to the immensely 
complicated and confused nature of many such cases. Often it is simply not possible for the 
prosecution (and perhaps even the protagonists themselves should they wish to do so) to 
produce a coherent account of exactly who did what to whom.16 Nevertheless, any individual 
who is proven to have been involved in an offence as either a principal or an accessory can 
be convicted of that offence. At sentencing, any such lack of specificity over the offender’s 
role necessarily limits the judge’s capacity to reflect the individual’s level of culpability in the 
sentence passed. Case law suggests that, in such a situation, the judge would be expected 
to sentence the offender as an accessory, since any contested facts that are adverse to the 
defendant must be proven to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt.17  
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 A final consideration is the large potential for misunderstanding over joint enterprise on the 
part of those who are convicted under the doctrine and their families and friends, as well as 
on the part of victims, victims’ supporters and the wider public. Even if the Supreme Court 
judgment in Jogee goes some way towards simplifying the law in this area, questions of how 
and why principal and accessorial liability are ascribed remain complex in terms of both legal 
doctrine and practical effect. Moreover, it is likely that there will be continuing controversy 
over joint enterprise as a general doctrine of criminal law, based on the perception that the 
scope of accessorial liability is still too wide, even with the abolition of its ‘parasitic’ form. In 
this context, the importance of clarity in judges’ sentencing remarks can hardly be over-
stated. The Judicial College might consider providing training on the most effective and 
appropriate ways of conveying sentencing decisions in cases involving multiple offenders – 
with a view to ensuring that defendants, victims and all others concerned in such cases 
(including any reporters covering them) have a clear understanding of the basis on which 
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